

Work Package 5: Case Study on Industrial Relations during Covid-19

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Introduction

The Marconi Airport of Bologna (Airport) has been selected as a case-study because of its longstanding commitment to tripartite social dialogue, and the innovative industrial relations practices born out of this dialogue locally, including a series of joint protocols signed between 2018 and 2022.¹ These protocols aim at jointly governing contracting out, continuity of employment and the response to passenger aggression toward airport employees. As we will see, the airport management company (concessionaire) Marconi Ariport of Bologna Spa (AdB), the Municipality of Bologna and the Metropolitan City of Bologna play key roles in this tripartite system of dialogue. In this context, AdB routinely goes above and beyond its formal responsibilities, reflecting a commitment to corporate transparency toward public institutions, and to guaranteeing the application of a common set of rules on contracting out procedures, including among handlers. We also examine the way the industrial relations system in the Marconi Airport play an important role at enhancing communication and coordination within the airport.

Section I: Context

While passengers transiting through the Bologna Airport might note that it has the quaint feel of a smaller, regional airport, it is Italy's 7th largest in terms of passenger volumes, and the 3rd largest (behind Milano Malpensa and Roma Fiumicino) in terms of cargo volumes. It is considered a strategically important airport by ENAC, the Italian civil aviation authority. This "city within a city" employees a total of 3,000 – 3,500 staff, depending on the season, across several different companies, covering both aviation and non-aviation services (e.g., parking, restaurants, duty free).

In accordance with EU rules, the Airport is managed by AdB, a majority publicly-owned joint stock company, listed on the Milan stock exchange. AdB holds an exclusive 40 year contract with ENAC for the management of the airport, which expires in 2046. AdB, whose founding goes back to 1961, was listed in 2015. The concessionaire controls two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Fast Freight Marconi and TAG Bologna. Taken together, the group employs just over 500 employees. The majority (67%) of AdB's employees are shift workers. AdB directly employs security, maintenance and administrative staff, and contracts out cleaning services, passenger queuing facilitation, and certain maintenance and IT functions.

One of the core functions in an airport is that of handling. Handling covers a range of services, including passenger services (e.g., check-in, gate-check, etc.) and ramp services (e.g. aircraft cleaning, fuelling, de-icing, moving aircraft, baggage loading/unloading). Under EU regulations, airports above 2 million passengers per year must liberalise these services via public tender. In AdB these services are provided by three separate handling companies, GH Bologna, Aviation Services and Aviapartner, employing 500, 140 and 63 employees respectively. The handling companies are a strange animal, in that they have no direct relationship with AdB, but rather are authorized by ENAC to operate within AdB. They compete amongst each other for contracts with specific airlines. They

¹ This case study was conducted by the Italian team on the basis of a review of the three joint protocols examined, desk research and interviews with a representative from AdB senior management and worker representatives from each of the confederal unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL, UGL) representing workers in AdB, GH Bologna, Aviation Services and Aviapartner.

only have a direct, commercial relationship with the airlines for whom they operate. (For example GH, the largest in AdB, is the handler for RyanAir).

Handling contracts are awarded based on cost, with competition among handlers for airline customers pushing handling companies to lower the costs offered to clients. Among union delegates, the handling contract is seen as a “poorer” contract, with respect to the airport operators’ contract, both in terms of wages and the quality of working conditions. Handlers are constantly pushed to do more with less, as passenger traffic continues to increase and low-cost carriers (LCCs), in particular, expect extremely short turnaround times for airplanes. This dynamic, according to interviews, leads to unsafe working conditions, as ground crews frequently lack the required number of operators. Handling companies are also increasingly finding challenges in attracting new employees to the profession. Reasons cited to explain this dynamic include the challenging shifts (handlers work around the clock, including split shifts that start in the middle of the night), in extreme weather conditions, are lower-paid and often have to endure long periods as seasonal employees before being hired full-time. (As one interviewee put it: “you can work eight years as a seasonal employee.”) And, as we will see in this case study, especially after travel resumed following the initial COVID lockdown, these workers are most vulnerable to aggressive passenger behaviours. Yet these workers are among the most essential in the airport: they fuel the planes, drive the heavy equipment that moves planes along the runway, play a critical security function and ensure that passengers and their baggage are routed correctly along their journey.

One notable feature of work within the airport, to which we will turn our attention again in the conclusion, is the degree to which, despite the highly interdependent nature of airport operations, there is minimal formal coordination across functional and organisational boundaries. One reason for the scarcity of formal coordination across firms is legal: Italian law prohibits it, requiring that relationships among service providers (e.g., AdB, handlers, airlines) be arms’ length. The formal coordination that does take place appears to be primarily bureaucratic. When performance standards, specified in the respective contract aren’t met, a disciplinary process may take place, after the fact. (For example, the airport operator may request that ENAC fine handling companies should the quality of their services fall below standards). Further, airlines often change handling providers, which results in personnel moving from one company to the other. AdB is responsible under its contract with ENAC for monitoring quality standards in the airport, but these measures are summative in nature, collected on a monthly and quarterly basis and don’t provide the kind of data needed to make real-time adjustments in response to changing conditions.

One important exception to legal and regulatory restrictions on formal coordination is safety. Here, an explicit regulation makes the airport management companies responsible for workplace safety for the entire worksite. To fulfil its role regarding safety, AdB employs an “Accountable Manager,” with responsibilities covering all airport operations (including handling, airlines, etc.) In addition, AdB coordinates the work of the Prevention and Protection Service Managers (RSPPs) within each firm operating in the airport.

Section II: Relevant Actors

Employees, except for those in non-aviation services, in the AdB are covered by the national, air transport value chain collective bargaining agreement (CBA), with workers in specific sectors covered by the relevant sector-specific agreements. In terms of this case study, the most relevant sector CBAs (all under the general framework of the value chain CBA) are the contracts with the airport management association (*Assaeroporti*) and the association of handling companies (*Assohandler*). The air transport CBA, general and sector-specific portions, are all signed by the main labour confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL) plus UGL.²

While, according to interviews, second level (integrative, or company-level) CBAs are increasingly rare in the sector, the handlers each apply a company-level CBA in addition to the national CBA. Only the contract with GH Bologna is negotiated by local workers representatives, while the others are negotiated at the group level, nationally. It is worth noting that the national-level CBA covering the handling sector, as of this writing, has yet to be renewed despite ongoing negotiations and a long-expired contract. (According to interviews, it is likely that without the COVID pandemic the handlers' contract would have likely been renewed in 2020.)

Workplace Representation

As further detailed in WP3, the Italian system of industrial relations allows for two types of single-channel workplace representation structures: the *Rappresentanza Sindacale Aziendale (RSA)* and *Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria (RSU)*. The RSA was introduced through legislation, the so-called "Workers' Statute" (Act n. 300/1970, article 19). Members of the RSA are directly appointed by the unions themselves (every union that is signatory to a collective agreement applied in an establishment can, therefore, appoint its own RSA). Members of the RSU (introduced as part of a tripartite agreement in 1993), instead, are directly elected by all employees within the workplace, every three years, on the basis of union lists.

In terms of the Marconi Airport, workers are represented through RSUs, with delegates elected directly, in AdB and GH Bologna. In Aviation Services and Aviapartner (not surprisingly given their relatively small size) workers are represented by RSAs, one for each of the signatories to the national CBA, with members appointed by the confederal unions. As is common in this case, members of the local union secretariat play the role of RSA. In the case of UIL, for example, the RSA for handlers is represented by a member of the regional secretariat who also is responsible for labour relations in public transit in addition to air transport.

Social Partners

Labour relations in the Marconi Airport of Bologna are unique in Italy, in part, because of their tripartite nature. This is consistent with the long-standing practice, in Bologna and the region of Emilia-Romagna, of tripartite social dialogue, and also reflects the priorities of the current and prior administrations in Bologna. Both administrations were and are determined to play a pro-active role in improving the quality of work within logistics and transportation.

The relevant actors in the context of this case study are:

- Pubic sector:
 - The Municipality of the City of Bologna
 - The Metropolitan City of Bologna (formerly the provincial government of Bologna)

² See WP3 for more on the system of industrial relations within the Italian air transport sector.

- Employers:
 - AdB Spa
 - GH Bologna
 - Aviation Services
 - Aviapartner
- Employees:
 - CGIL,
 - CISL
 - UIL
 - UGL

The main employee representatives, cited above, are each confederal unions. While rank-and-file unions (e.g., USB, SBG) are also present within the Marconi Airport, including in RSUs, they mainly limit themselves to agitating from the outside, and don't participate in collective bargaining and social dialogue, according to delegates we interviewed.

The Municipality and Metropolitan City of Bologna, in the current and previous administration, have made improving the quality of working conditions in transportation and logistics a priority, as we will see in the next section of the case study. In addition, the airport management company, AdB, has played a leadership role, frequently going above and beyond its mandated role, in attempting to better coordinate the activities of the various firms providing services within the Airport, and to improve the quality of employment and working conditions. This commitment to tripartite social dialogue has proven essential to producing the innovative protocols described below and to enhancing opportunities for communication and coordination across the site.

Section III: Industrial Relations

While there are barriers to formal coordination, across organizational boundaries, of work within the airport, the industrial relations system offers ample opportunities to leverage the informal networks of the confederal unions, and features specific structures that favour communication and coordination around issues of common interest. In addition to the workplace representation structures described above (RSU, RSA), social partners regularly come together in ad hoc workgroups constructed to address specific issues that cut across boundaries (e.g., aggression against airport personnel). In addition, there is a formal labour coordinating body (*Attivo*) whose members include representatives from the RSUs and RSAs, across employers within the Marconi Airport. Finally, there is a rich, informal network that supports work in these formal union structures that cuts across boundaries, described by one union delegate as “formally, informal” which helps delegates coordinate activities and decision-making. This is all facilitated by the confederal (cross-cutting) nature of the main workers representatives.

Again, the area of safety represents an opportunity for greater coordination across boundaries. In addition to Adb’s role in safety training and compliance, there are Safety Reps (RLS), elected by workers. The Safety Reps, by law, enjoy important rights to information and consultation, training, participation and monitoring. According to one delegate interviewed, the RLS greatly facilitate coordination.

Tripartite social dialogue at the Marconi Airport

Three years after the Protocol in the field of works, supplies and services procurement (2015)³ concluded by the Municipality of Bologna and the main local social partners and in accordance with it, the Adb signed in 2018 a *Protocol on contracting out* with the Municipality of Bologna, the Metropolitan City of Bologna and the local Union Confederation of CGIL, CISL and UIL to guarantee regular, legal and safe working conditions in case of outsourcing.

Besides engaging public actors to guarantee its effective implementation, the 2018 Protocol on contracting out entrusts the Adb with specific responsibilities. First, Adb set up a joint observatory in charge of monitoring the implementation of the protocol objectives. Second, Adb committed to excluding those contracting companies breaking the fundamental health and safety rules and including the so called “social clause,” aimed at maintaining the same wage and working conditions for workers whose employer changes due to a change of contract. Thirdly, Adb committed to facilitate the negotiation of a new Protocol specifically addressed to handling companies. Since Adb can only exert indirect pressure on handling companies, because the handling companies only have a direct commercial relationship with the airlines, Adb also calls for the involvement of ENAC to persuade handling companies to maintain wages and working conditions in the case of a change of contract.

In accordance with the 2018 Protocol, a new Work Site Protocol was signed in 2019 by the three handling companies working at the Bologna Airport and the sectoral union federations of CGIL, CISL, UIL and UGL, at the local level. The Work-Site Protocol was also signed by Adb to guarantee protocol compliance. Given the scope of the protocol, Adb’s signature was not required: additional confirmation of the proactive role of the airport management company, in the absence of a specific role taken on by ENAC, in pushing the handling companies to apply the “social clause” in case of change of contract as stated in the General Part (art.25) and in the Sector-Specific Collective agreement (art. H37) of the Air Transport Collective Bargaining Agreement. As emerged in the

³ https://www.cgilbo.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Protocollo_Appalti_firmato_6_luglio_2015_CORRETTO.pdf

interviews, two are the most relevant outputs of the Work-Site Report. First, the limitation of subcontracting to cooperatives with the only exception of fuelling and cleaning services: all subcontracted workers were re-employed in the handling companies and in the airport management company. Secondly, it establishes a set of criteria (age, seniority and professional profile) to identify the personnel to be transferred in case of change of contract.

The orientation to tripartite social dialogue of the AdB is confirmed also in the Metropolitan Charter for Ethical Logistics⁴ signed in 2020 together with the Municipality and the Metropolitan City of Bologna, local social partners, local public institutions, associations and stakeholders. The Metropolitan Charter aims at pointing out the principles and values of the logistics sector at the metropolitan level not only in terms of income and economic growth, but also of well-being of the community, of sustainable development of the territory and the environment.

More recently, an Addendum to the 2018 Protocol on contracting out was signed in July 2022 following some cases of physical aggression by passengers against ground staff working at the Bologna Airport. The new Addendum is aimed at developing a structural dialogue between the Airport and the trade unions in order to identify some solutions with the support of the Prefecture of Bologna, ENAC and the police offices at the airport (State Police and *Guardia di Finanza*).

Unruly and disruptive behaviour of passengers at the airport

While air travel is by far the safest form of transport, with billions of passengers travelling safely each year (thanks to collective efforts among government, manufacturers, unions and airline companies), the unruly and disruptive behaviour⁵ of single passengers has a disproportionate adverse impact on other passengers and cabin crew. In 2014, Member States of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognized the growing frequency and severity of such incidents, and agreed on significant changes to international air law, adopting the Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (known as the Montréal Protocol 2014 or MP14). More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic brought the issue of unruly and disruptive behaviour to the attention of governments and regulators vividly because of non-compliance with different national health rules, in particular mask wearing. Furthermore, the sudden upturn in air traffic in the spring 2022, and the employment shortage in ground handling workers, caused long queues and disruptions that led to tensions and conflicts between passengers and airport staff.

Statistics from both industry and regulators such as the UK Civil Aviation Authority, the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) point to a long-term trend of increasing frequency and severity of unruly passenger incidents. According to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (Easa⁶) *“every 3 hours the safety of a flight within the EU is threatened by passengers demonstrating unruly or disruptive behaviour. At least 70% of these incidents involve some form of aggression”*. Based on the IATA reporting system for safety-related incidents, the number of

⁴https://www.cittametropolitana.bo.it/portale/Engine/RAServeFile.php/f/news/CartaLogistica_no_crocini_esc_%283%29.pdf

⁵ The terms “unruly passengers”, “disruptive passengers” and “unruly and disruptive passengers” are commonly understood to refer to passengers who fail to respect the rules of conduct on board aircraft or to follow the instructions of crew members and thereby create a threat to flight safety and/or disturb the good order and discipline on board aircraft. IATA (2022) Even safer and more enjoyable air travel for all, Second Edition. <https://www.iata.org/contentassets/b7efd7f114b44a30b9cf1ade59a02f06/tackling-unruly-disruptive-passengers-strategy.pdf>

⁶ <https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/notonmyflight>

unruly and disruptive behaviour has rapidly increased since 2021: the incident rate per 1,000 flights was equal to 1 in 2020 and then rose to 1.13 in 2021 and up to 1.20 in the first semester 2022.

To prevent and manage the rapid increase of unruly and disruptive behaviour at the airports, several practices have been realized within the European civil aviation (see ETF 2022 report⁷) by different stakeholders (airline companies, public partners, airport authorities, trade unions). Among these, the Protocol on Safety at work signed at the Marconi Airport in July 2022 represents an interesting case because of the proactive role of trade unions, the involvement of the local Government and the mandatory nature of the process implemented.

Protocol on emergency procedure against unruly passengers' behaviour

In line with the general trend registered in other EU airports, the Bologna Airport experienced a considerable escalation in unruly behaviours of passengers (verbal-physical attack) also due to Covid restrictions. But not only. As emerged in the interviews, the general pressure on time-compression and work organisation exerted by the low-cost business model has progressively made the relationships with passengers more tense and conflictual. The rise of internal tensions led the same AdB and trade unions to ask for a higher number of police officers at the airport, even before the Covid-10 outbreak.

In April 2019, following the increase of incidents of violence against airport staff, workers representatives of AdB together with local trade unions called on the airport community to take part in the EASA campaign on Unruly passengers⁸. Billboards and videos were published and broadcasted on terminal screens and on Bologna Airport Social media pages.

⁷ ETF, 2022, Preventing and Managing Disruptive incidents in Civil Aviation, Compendium on best practices in Europe, Brussels. <https://www.etf-europe.org/resource/preventing-and-managing-disruptive-incidents-in-civil-aviation-compendium-on-best-practices-in-europe/>

⁸ <https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/unruly-passengers-campaign-get-involved>

Figure 1 – Billboards published at the Bologna Airport for the EASA campaign on Unruly pax



During the summer of 2021, there was an escalation of physical violence of passengers against front-line workers at the Bologna Airport, mainly due to Covid-19 restrictions, that led trade unions to organise a strike in October 2021, to bring to light the impact of unruly behaviours on working conditions and quality of service, and to gain the involvement local public administrations on that issue. Immediately after the strike, trade unions started to gather data from ground handling employees on the type of aggression experienced: from November 2021 to January 2022 the large majority (67%) out of 15 incidents were related to Covid-19 documentation, 20% to ancillary payments at check-in or gates, 7% due to flight loss and 7% to queuing. Furthermore, the data showed that female employees are the most exposed to passengers' aggression.

At the beginning of 2022, ENAC promoted the constitution of a working group including AdB, the handling companies, police officers and trade unions with a view to defining together a system to manage unruly and disruptive behaviours of passengers. The working group elaborated a coordinated system for reporting and reacting to episodes of violence:

- In the case of aggression or dangerous situation, an emergency number for the AdB Control Security Room is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The AdB Security Agents register the call, ask information about the event and activate a dedicated software alerting via Telegram the security staff, police officers and the financial police;
- Two Army soldiers are present at the airport and their office is located close to the check-in area in order to guarantee immediate assistance;
- All the AdB security agents were informed and trained on this procedure and received specific guidance on how to react in case of passenger aggression. The AdB training centre organised,

together with a labour psychologist, a training course for front-line personnel on how to cope with unruly passengers: communication strategies, behavioural methods, how to recognise and anticipate aggressive attitudes. The training course was also addressed to handling company trainers;

- A revised version of the Airport Regulations including the new emergency procedure was distributed throughout the airport community;
- A monitoring and supervising group meets periodically to update and assess the effectiveness of the new emergency procedure.

Figure 2 – The Emergency Procedure



According to the latest available data (April-July 2022), in the period of time under observation, the new emergency procedure was activated 26 times: the episodes of aggression occurred more often at the check-in desk (56%) and at gates during boarding (30%).

Finally, the Metropolitan City of Bologna and the Municipality of Bologna signed the Addendum to the Report on contracting out, further confirming their proactive role in guaranteeing the full implementation of the report’s contents. Furthermore, the local public administrations commit themselves to support any information and training initiatives on safety at work and to constantly promote the dialogue with the public security authorities.

From the interviews, two critical aspects seem to emerge:

- From the point of view of police officers, the emergency procedure is often perceived as an intrusive form of work control as it monitors their response time;
- Even though the emergency procedure has been widely disseminated along the airport community, workers do not always activate it in the case of unruly behaviours which means that the data could underestimate the real cases of passenger aggression.

Conclusion

We chose this case study because of the tripartite social dialogue, and in particular the protocol on passenger aggression. We found the innovative practices we expected to find, and much more. What emerged for the research team was also the central role that IR plays in enhancing Relational Coordination within a highly fragmented system and in helping IR take a value-chain perspective to bargaining and social dialogue.

The joint protocols on contracting out, employment continuity and protecting workers against aggression are the fruit of a high functioning, tri-partite system of labour relations, grounded in social dialogue and a commitment to improving the quality of work within the airport. There is no doubt that the willingness of AdB to routinely go above and beyond its mandated role is also a key element in the effectiveness of the IR system. In the case of the Marconi Airport, these practices are consistent with the long-standing, consolidated tradition of tri-partite social dialogue within the Emilia-Romagna region. These practices are also reflective of the move, over the past few decades, in aviation toward a “value-chain” approach to collective bargaining, and the emergence of the airport operators and confederal unions as the primary partners in social dialogue and collective bargaining. (These dynamics are more fully documented in WP3.) This case study also provides evidence that industrial relations practices may be making up for challenges in coordinating work across multiple organisations. The informal networks of the confederal unions and the different IR structures we observed may also serve to improve what organizational development literature calls “Relational Coordination.”

The theory of Relational Coordination, created in the 1990s by researchers observing flight departures in the airline industry, posits that the quality of the relationships within a system influence the performance outcomes of that system.⁹ When work is “highly interdependent, uncertain or time sensitive” (clearly the case in airport operations), relationships characterized by “shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect,” supported by “frequent, timely, accurate and problem-solving communication,” result in higher performance, along dimensions that include quality, efficiency, worker well-being, learning and innovation. The literature demonstrates the importance of creating cross-cutting structures to support Relational Coordination: structures like “training for teamwork,” “boundary spanner roles,” “shared meetings,” and “shared protocols and routines.” These formal structures appear to be lacking in the Marconi Airport, mainly due to limitations due to law and regulation. However, we find evidence that the system of industrial relations may be, to some degree, making up for the lack of such structures and processes, thereby enhancing Relational Coordination in the airport. The confederal (cross-cutting) nature of unions and the ability of the IR system to leverage unions’ informal networks may also enhance Relational Coordination.

Specifically, structures like ad hoc working groups, workplace safety committees, the union delegates’ coordinating body and the joint protocols, constitute important examples of Relational Coordination structures. In this context, the protocol against unruly passenger behaviour covered in this case study appears to put in place several important Relational Coordination structures: 1.) a cross-cutting labour-management committee to study the issue and monitor implementation of the protocol, 2.) training across boundaries 3.) sharing real-time information widely, and 4.) coordinating

⁹ Bolton, Logan, Gittell (2021), “Revisiting Relational Coordination: A Systematic Review,” in *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 1–33.

responses across multiple boundaries, including AdB, handlers, security, police and military personnel in the airport.

Given the importance of cross-cutting coordination in air transport, and the objective limits on such coordination within the context of the Marconi Airport of Bologna, the model of industrial relations, and the specific protocols we studied, may also constitute a unique “value add” in terms of enhancing operational performance. And, as the Relational Coordination literature documents, efforts that increase the quality of relationships and communication across boundaries improve not just quality and efficiency, but also contribute to enhancing worker well-being.

Case-study evaluation

Criteria	Evaluation on a scale of 1-5 (1=minimum, 5=max)	1	2	3	4	5
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	x	<input type="checkbox"/>
Innovation	<p>Explanation: to what degree does the topic/subject analysed in the case study deviate from existing practices and legal frameworks? Why the case study is innovative?</p> <p>There are two innovative elements in this case: 1.) The role industrial relations play in enhancing coordination across service providers (handlers, AdB, etc.) in the airport, which at a formal and legal level are highly fragmented, by introducing examples of Relational Coordination structures 2.) The tripartite social dialogue at the local level in which Public Actors, trade unions and companies along the value chain are deeply cooperating to improve working conditions and guaranteeing a high-standard quality service. In a context of sectoral industrial relations mainly driven by company collective bargaining, the tripartite protocols and the active engagement of the airport management company in guaranteeing better working conditions along the value chain is a positive practice of inclusive industrial relations.</p>					

Criteria	Evaluation on a scale of 1-5 (1=minimum, 5=max)	1	2	3	4	5
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	x
Transferability	<p>Explanation: to what degree can the results/lessons learnt in the case-study be transferred along the air transport value chain? other sectors? other countries?</p> <p>As the organisation of the Airports and the structure of the air transport value chain respond to European and international regulations, the tripartite forms of industrial relations experienced in the Bologna Airport can be easily transferred to other countries involving the whole value chain. Furthermore, the last Protocol against passenger aggression provides for specific emergency measures that can be easily adopted in other Airports. It should also be possible to transfer practices that enhance Relational Coordination: at a minimum all EU countries require collaboration among unions and employers in matters of safety. As this case demonstrates, safety can be an important lever for addressing issues of coordination.</p>					

Criteria	Evaluation on a scale of 1-5 (1=minimum, 5=max)	1	2	3	4	5
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	x
Inclusiveness	<p>Explanation: to what degree does the topic/subject analysed in the case-study see the involvement of partners and public actors?</p> <p>These practices are highly inclusive, in that they involve the entire value chain, as well as public actors. The first tripartite social dialogue agreement was concluded in 2018 in the field of contracting out and subcontracting along the air transport value chain. Even the most recent Protocol on safety procedures in the case of passenger aggression has been signed by the Municipality of Bologna, guaranteeing its role of coordination among the public police and security authorities.</p>					

Criteria	Evaluation on a scale of 1-5 (1=minimum, 5=max)	1	2	3	4	5
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	x	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Covid-19 causality	<p>Explanation: <i>to what degree is the topic/subject analysed in the case-study directly related to the Covid-19 outbreak?</i></p> <p><i>The orientation to tripartitism of the industrial relations at the Marconi Airport put down its roots before the Covid-19 outbreak but the last Protocol against passenger aggressions was signed in 2022 precisely because the number of attacks rose due to the health restrictions imposed to stop the contagion from covid-19</i></p>
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